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Although often dismissed as a villain, Callicles’ views about philosophy, politics, and 
human nature expressed in his speech in Plato’s Gorgias criticizing Socrates turn-out to 
be similar to Socrates’ own thoughts about philosophy, politics, and human nature when 
compared to Socrates’ arguments in other dialogues such as the Republic. However, 
Socrates obfuscates these similarities through his use of rhetoric in the latter part of the 
dialogue in order to conceal a more fundamental disagreement about the priority and 
relationship of philosophy and politics. This similarity and obfuscation constitutes an 
important and overlooked teaching of Plato’s Gorgias.    
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The irony of Plato’s Gorgias is that it is the seeming villain Callicles who 
ultimately has the most important things to say about the relationship between politics 
and philosophy. Most scholars have overlooked the merits of his speech for a variety of 
reasons. With a few exceptions, scholars of past generations tended to prematurely 
dismiss Callicles remarks as little more than “Plato’s dramatic embodiment of all the 
immoralist tendencies.”1 Callicles “draws the last consequences of the doctrines of 
naturalism, relativism, subjectivism, and individualism that are in the air.”2 Voegelin 
remarks that Callicles is “the public representative of the corrupt order.”3 Friedlander 
equates Callicles’ argument about the “law of nature” to Nietzsche’s “will-to-power” and 
his rejection of convention to Nietzsche’s “slave morality”.4 Some recent scholars argue 
along these same lines. Ranasinghe remarks that Callicles is a “hedonist and nihilist” and 
that he “embodies the view that the means justify the end—whatever it is.”5   
Other scholars have looked beyond these pejorative depictions and have made 
more progress in uncovering the merit of Callicles’ understanding of politics. Gentzler, 
for example, argues that “Socrates ridicules and misrepresents Callicles’ views,” but 
nonetheless still concludes that Socrates’ defense of the philosophic life and therewith his 
idealistic approach to politics wins-out over Callicles’ views.6 Pangle argues that 
                                                 
1 Paul Shorey, What Plato Said? (Chicago, 1933), pp. 141. 
2 Ibid., p. 142. 
3 Eric Voegelin, ‘The Philosophy of Existence: Plato’s Gorgias’, The Review of Politics 
Vol.11, No.4 (October, 1949) pp. 477-498, p. 481. 
4 Ibid., p. 260, 262. Voegelin and Shorey also make some comparison between Callicles’s 
view and Nietzsche.  See also E.R. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias: A Revised Text with 
Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, 1959), pp. 28-29. 
5 Nalin Ranasinghe, Socrates in the Underworld: On Plato’s Gorgias (Indiana, 2009), pp. 
77-78. 
6 Jyl Gentzler, ‘The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias’, Ancient 
Philosophy 15 (1995) pp. 17-43, p. 40; Cf. Walter Newell, The Ruling Passion: The 
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Callicles should be compared with Socrates interest in, and failed attempt to teach, 
Alcibiades, which suggests there is more kinship between Callicles and Socrates than 
appears on the surface. Like Alcibiades, Callicles is perhaps a potential philosopher.7  
Stauffer argues that Callicles is secretly a moralist contrary to the views of many 
scholars.8 He remarks, “The heart of the problem, as Callicles’ response shows, is the 
painful indignation and fear that arises with the thought that the virtuous do not always 
receive the fate they deserve or that justice has little power in the world.”9 Callicles is 
incapable of philosophy, because he lacks the courage to admit this to himself. He is 
afraid if he did, he would have to admit that his hidden moral inclinations cannot be 
satisfied. Thus, it is fear that animates Callicles’ indignation and thereby his critique of 
the philosophic life according to Stauffer.10   
Grote also makes headway when he argues that, despite other commentators’ 
claims, Callicles’ speech does not depict the teachings of any known sophists, “or any 
other common doctrine.”11 He points out that Callicles, in fact, deprecates the sophists.  
Grote further notes that despite Socrates’ criticism that Callicles is enthralled by the 
demos and Athenian political community, “The language which Plato puts into the mouth 
of Kallikles is noway consistent with the attribute which he ascribes to him—slavish 
deference to the judgments of the Athenian Demos.”12 He also notes that Callicles is 
“made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it [his views]”, yet his 
understanding of politics, particularly the motive of fear, is more valid than Socrates 
concedes.13   
I will argue that although Socrates does reveal, through his cross-examination, 
problems with Callicles’ views and seems to demonstrate to the audience the superiority 
of conventional morality to the Realpolitik that Callicles endorses, the fervor and 
rhetorical flare with which he does so is intended to obfuscate the more decisive part of 
Callicles’ critique that Socrates knows to be well founded. Callicles’ speech and critique 
of philosophy is a real, albeit subtle, critique of the philosophic life as Socrates led it. His 
                                                 
Erotics of Statecraft in Platonic Political Philosophy (Maryland, 2000), pp. 9-39; and 
Richard McKim, ‘Shame and the Truth of Plato’s Gorgias’ In Platonic Writings, Platonic 
Readings (Pennsylvania, 2002), pp. 34-48. 
7 Thomas Pangle, ‘Plato’s Gorgias as a vindication of Socratic Education’, Polis Vol.10 
(1991) pp. 3-21, p. 20. 
8 Devin Stauffer, ‘Socrates and Callicles: A Reading of Plato’s Gorgias’, Review of 
Politics Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn, 2002) pp. 627-657. 
9 Devin Stauffer, The Unity of Plato’s Gorgias (Chicago, 2006), p. 118; Alessandra Fussi 
remarks, “Given the importance of rhetoric in Callicles’ view of his own future, one is 
led to wonder if that indignation is entirely sincere [‘Callicles’ Examples of the law of 
nature in Plato’s Gorgias’, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal Vol. 19, No. 1 (1996) 
pp. 39-58, p. 54.]  Fussi argues that Callicles attitude toward Socrates is not indignation 
but “ambivalence” (Ibid. p. 55). 
10 Ibid., p. 649. 
11 George Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates Vol. 1 (London, 1865), p. 
114.   
12 Ibid., p. 114. 
13 Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
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speech is reminiscent of Nietzsche, as some scholars have argued, but not just the 
doctrine of “will to power” or “slave morality”. More importantly, it calls to mind 
Nietzsche’s critique of Socrates in Twilight of the Idols.14 Plato seems to anticipate this 
sort of critique, and, as I will argue, not simply dismiss or disagree with it.15  Rather, 
Callicles’ speech in the Gorgias represents in a certain sense the most true teaching about 




Like the Republic the Gorgias addresses the question of what is the most just way 
of life.16 Also, in both dialogues Socrates defends justice against a Realpolitik approach 
to politics as advocated by Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the Republic and Polus and 
Callicles in the Gorgias. However, the manner in which he does so is very different 
owing to the different interlocutors, different circumstances, and, as I contend, Socrates’ 
different rhetorical intentions. The Republic takes place in private, outside Athens in the 
Piraeus, and it is a conversation that Socrates is compelled into and does so with some 
reluctance and reservations (327c, 368b). In contrast, the Gorgias is one of the few 
dialogues Socrates himself instigates. It takes place in Athens, in public, in front of some 
of the leading young men of Athens who have gathered to hear Gorgias.17   
Not only does Socrates defend conventional morality, but he makes a more 
extreme and rhetorical argument than in the Republic whereby the philosophic life as he 
led it seems to coalesce with a defense of law-abidingness and is in fact, “the true 
political art” (521d7).18 His extreme and uncompromising defense of the law-abiding life 
creates a confrontation, not just with Polus, the student of the type of rhetoric Gorgias 
practices, but more importantly with the upstart politician Callicles, which leads to a 
more explicit critique and challenge of the life that Socrates led, the philosophic life, by 
                                                 
14 Ch2, “The Problem of Socrates”. 
15 Cf. Mark Lutz, Socrates’ Education to Virtue: Learning the Love of the Noble (New 
York, 1998), pp. 16-24. 
16 Several scholars have noted the similarities in these dialogues and the aid of 
comparison for understanding their complexities. For example, Friedlander argues that 
book one of the Republic is the most similar dialogue to the Gorgias and that Callicles is 
an “exaggerated” version of Thrasymachos (Plato, p. 244). Ranasinghe comments, “It is 
worth noting that the designed impossibility of assigning the Gorgias a dramatic date 
suggests strongly that it should be read not before or after the Republic but beside it 
(Socrates in the Underworld, p. 77).” Fussi remarks, “I think that an accurate comparison 
between Callicles’ personal myth and the myth of the cave would be of great interest if 
we wanted to see what exactly is at stake in philosophy which is not at stake in Callicles’ 
own imitation of philosophy (‘Callicles Examples’, p. 140).” 
17 For an extended discussion of the setting of the Gorgias and its peculiarities see 
Alessandra Fussi, ‘Why Is the Gorgias so Bitter?’, Philosophy and Rhetoric Vol.33, No.1 
(2000) pp. 39-58, particularly §2. 
18 This and all subsequent translations from the Greek are my own from Plato. Platonis 
Opera, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903). 
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Callicles than is addressed in the Republic.19 Consequently, the tension between politics 
and philosophy is more sharply contrasted in the Gorgias, and we may hope to gain 
insights we cannot learn from the Republic alone. This confrontation makes the Gorgias 
one of the most polemic and therefore political Platonic dialogues, one in which Socrates 
seems the most eager to refute his interlocutors, especially Callicles, and impress and 
influence Gorgias and the leading young men of Athens who have gathered to hear him.  
The very first word of the Gorgias in Greek is war (polemos).   
 
The initial theme of the Gorgias is rhetoric. What is Plato’s interest in depicting 
Socrates’ examination and debate about rhetoric with Gorgias? We know from 
Aristophanes’ Clouds that Socrates had a reputation as a teacher of rhetoric. In fact, the 
very criticism that Socrates tacitly makes against Gorgias in the Gorgias is the criticism 
Aristophanes makes against Socrates in the Clouds. Socrates argues that rhetoric, at least 
the way Gorgias teaches and seems to understand it, is morally irresponsible. It gives 
students power without teaching or ensuring moral responsibility.  In theory it is a skill or 
power to do good or ill for oneself or the city. Yet, in practice this moral neutrality can 
lead to ill owing to the fact that Gorgias does not teach his students what is just and good 
(460a). This is what Aristophanes shows through the dramatic effect of Pheidippides’ 
becoming the student of Socrates in the Clouds. 
Consequently, although several Platonic dialogues are in a sense a reply to the 
criticisms against Socrates in the Clouds, e.g. The Apology, the Gorgias is particularly 
aimed at addressing those charges and showing that while Socrates did employ rhetorical 
arguments, they were not meant, intentionally at least, to be subversive, at least not 
necessarily, but were arguably an attempt at a new, noble sort of rhetoric, a type of 
rhetoric in the service of philosophy and the contemplative life. To this end, Socrates 
makes many remarks in the Gorgias as though he were presenting a case in court like the 
debate between the Just and Unjust Speech in the Clouds (see 417e2-472c, 475e8-476a9, 
486e7-488b2). This means these remarks and the arguments Socrates makes must be 
considered not simply on their own merits, as some scholars have done, but particularly 
in light of the dramatic setting and their intended affect on the audience.   
The main intention of rhetoric is not principally to teach but persuade, as Socrates 
leads Gorgias to admit (453a2). Socrates uses rhetoric in the dialogue for the sake of the 
audience and also, arguably, for the sake of showing Gorgias a nobler use of rhetoric or 
way to make the use of rhetoric noble in the sense of truly contributing to the good of the 
city, not just the individual so skilled. With this in mind, it should not be surprising that 
the philosophic life as Socrates led it is not simply equivalent to the way Socrates depicts 
it in the dialogue as coalescing with law-abidingness and conventional morality and that 
the depiction of politics he endorses is not his final thought on the subject. In fact, the life 
dedicated to philosophy as Socrates actually lived it is perhaps not simply more just than 
the political life as Callicles depicts it. The mere fact that Callicles and the others are not 
entirely persuaded by Socrates’ refutation suggests that there is more to Callicles’ critique 
than Socrates is willing to address, in public at least.   
                                                 
19 In the Republic Adeimantus does object at one point and accuses the philosophers of 
being useless in the city (487d5), a charge Callicles also makes. However, Adeimantus 
does not explicitly challenge Socrates the way Callicles does. 




 Callicles is not as rash and impetuous as his speech seems to suggest. He does not 
badger his way into the conversation like Polus (448a6). He is the last of the three, after 
Gorgias and Polus, to take up a defense of rhetoric, more precisely a critique of Socrates’ 
uncompromising law-abidingness or conventionality and defense of a Realpolitik 
approach to politics. In fact, it is never altogether clear to what extent Callicles believes 
in the power of rhetoric. Although he seems to be more shameless than Polus, this is at 
least in part due to the fact that Polus is not a citizen of Athens (487b1).  Polus is inclined 
to be more reserved.  Callicles, on the other hand, is not merely a citizen, but a leading 
citizen just beginning a political career.20   
Socrates praises Callicles as having the qualities necessary for debating the 
underlying issue at stake in Socrates’ understanding of rhetoric, what is the most just way 
of life (487a3), as he did not Polus or Gorgias.21 While Polus and Gorgias praise political 
power, there is no indication that they have or are pursuing political careers. Callicles has 
more at stake and more interest in the question, which suggests there is more conviction 
in his words. Also, he is an erotic man, like Socrates, making him, in a way, a sort of 
kindred spirit.22 It subsequently becomes evident, or so Socrates seems to demonstrate to 
the crowd, that Callicles has not fully understood nor thought through what he professes.  
Nonetheless, he does really take the way of life one chooses seriously, which is not as 
clear with Polus and Gorgias. Rutherford comments, after Socrates has silenced Gorgias 
and Polus, “Socrates has now moved to the center-stage, showing himself a much more 
extraordinary man than Gorgias; and Callicles has moved from being the complacent 
patron to a state of astounded curiosity.”23       
 Further, the objection with which Callicles enters the conversation is sincere when 
he turns to Chairephon and asks, “Tell me, is Socrates being serious about these things or 
playing (481b7)?”24  Socrates’ refutation of Polus is so farfetched, his praise of the just 
                                                 
20 Friedlander, Plato, pp. 266-267. 
21 Stauffer argues that this remark by Socrates is wholly ironic or “the opposite of its 
surface meaning”, questioning in particular that Callicles has received a good education.  
To the contrary, I think Socrates praise is more or less sincere. The Unity, p. 93; cf. Seth 
Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus 
(Chicago, 1991), p. 62. 
22 Pangle, ‘Plato’s Gorgias’, p. 20. 
23 R.B. Rutherford, The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation (London, 
1995), p. 158. 
24 Fussi, following up on Rutherford’s comment, remarks that Socrates seems to Callicles 
either “the greatest rhetorician—since he was able to defeat both Gorgias and Polus—and 
thus he knows exceedingly well the spells and witchcraft whereby one is supposed to 
tame lions—or he is himself a lion [emphasis added], since he was never charmed by the 
nomos. Or perhaps both.” She continues, “Callicles discussion with Socrates arises, on 
his part, out of the need to find out if Socrates can offer him an instrument as omnipotent 
as Gorgias’ rhetoric claimed to be (‘Callicles’ Examples’, p. 136).” 
Steven Thomason, Ph.D. 6 
life so extreme, it calls into question its validity and cannot help but provoke an attack.25  
Is Socrates arguing what he in fact really thinks to be true, or is he just making a 
sophisticated rhetorical display? If the latter is the case, to what purpose? Without 
examining the argument further, there is no way to judge the sincerity and validity of 
Socrates’ claims.   
Callicles’ resurrection of Polus’ argument is similar to Glaucon’s resurrection of 
Thrasymachus’ argument in the Republic. While Callicles is more forthcoming in his 
praise of injustice, the motive is similar. Can Socrates back up his praise of justice and 
his radically idealistic approach to politics? Despite his unabashed praise of tyranny, like 
Glaucon, Callicles has a genuine interest in justice, at least to the extent that it contributes 
to his own good and good of his family, friends, and city. Thus, his praise of tyranny is 
exaggerated like Glaucon’s comparison between the just and unjust man: an exaggeration 
for the sake of clarity, i.e. compelling Socrates to clarify his own views. As Friedlander 
puts it, men who truly believe what Callicles condones would not enter into a discussion 
of it at all, because to do so would “acknowledge the validity of a law that must, 
ultimately, cause their downfall.”26       
 Consequently, Callicles makes an unabashed praise of rhetoric, or tyranny to be 
precise, and thereby the life devoted to politics, despite jeopardizing his own reputation, 
because of his interest in the truth of the matter. Socrates acknowledges this: “When there 
is present, therefore, mine and your agreement, already it will hold the completion of 
truth (487e7).” Since Socrates himself has made an extreme and rhetorical defense of 
conventional justice, it is not surprising that Callicles makes an extreme and rhetorical 
praise of injustice. This is not because Callicles is really that base, which Socrates’ 
subsequent examination reveals, but simply to uncover, if possible, the truth.     
 Callicles’ speech against Socrates has three parts. The first is his distinction 
between nature (phusis) and convention (nomos) and its implications (482e3-484c2). The 
second is his critique of the life devoted to philosophy (484c3-485e2). The third is his 
exhortation to Socrates to take more of an interest in politics and renounce philosophy as 
a way of life (485e3-486d1).  
 
Nature and Convention 
    
The first thing Callicles does is accuse Socrates of acting like a “true demagogue” 
(482c3), an accusation he twice repeats. Socrates, ironically, to a certain extent admits as 
much towards the end of the dialogue when he says that he alone of the current 
                                                 
25 Stauffer, The Unity, p. 651. 
26 Plato, p. 261; Stauffer argues more extensively for Callicles hidden attachment to 
justice, as I have mentioned. However, I do not see the sense of indignation to the extent 
he does. To be interested in justice to the extent that it contributes to one’s own good is 
not the same as indignation. Stauffer points to Callicles’ response at 511b1, “Isn’t this, 
indeed, the irritating thing?” to Socrates’ admission that the one gratifying the rulers will 
get the better of the one who does not, as a key piece of evidence for his thesis (The 
Unity, pp. 117-118). Yet, I read that remark as half-hearted, because at that point in the 
conversation Callicles has long since stopped taking Socrates’ arguments seriously and is 
just going along with them for the sake of Gorgias. 
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politicians practices “the true art of politics (521d6)”. By that point it has become clear 
that what his discussions with Polus and Gorgias aimed at was not so much to learn from 
them the true power of rhetoric, but to debunk in front of the gathered crowd the sham 
rhetoric taught by Polus and Gorgias with the new and improved Socratic rhetoric. Since 
he is speaking to an audience, he could not teach them the truth about the relationship 
between justice and rhetoric (he does not even address the question what is justice as he 
does in the Republic), he must just persuade (454d-455a).   
Callicles notes the sophistry Socrates applied, namely the ambiguity between 
nature and convention (483a1-5), in refuting Polus. Demos remarks, “The opposition 
between phusis and nomos is reflected in the discrepancy between Polus’ true sentiments 
and his reluctance to proclaim them. One infers that phusis somehow corresponds to 
Polus’ view of reality while nomos, designating ‘the general consensus’, impedes him 
stating his view.”27 Socrates intentionally avoids raising or addressing the question of 
what justice is precisely to get away with this sort of sophistry.  Consequently, it is not at 
all clear to what extent Socrates really believes in, and condones, conventional justice 
from his discussion with Polus as opposed to a more enlightened, philosophic 
understanding of justice such as that which emerges in the Republic. The fact that he 
never concedes that the tyrant Archelaus is unjust suggests that he does not simply 
believe conventional justice is true justice, whatever that might be, despite the fact that he 
later draws parallels between justice as law-abidingness and health of the soul.   
Further, considered in comparison to the image of justice that emerges in the 
Republic, it is difficult to say Archelaus is simply unjust. In the Republic Socrates argues 
for a type of justice that is the order of one’s own soul, not principally the relationship 
between souls or different people: the kallipolis does not consider the good or “justice” it 
owes to other cities. Socrates does suggest that the kallipolis should be more merciful to 
other Greek cities than barbarians. Nonetheless, the question or problem of justice as a 
relationship between different people or cities is largely dropped and substituted for an 
internal and selfish conception of justice.28 
Callicles then attempts to avoid this sophistry by defining convention or law 
(nomos). “I think those establishing the laws are the weak human beings and the many.  
Therefore, it is for themselves and their own profit that they establish laws and praise 
their praises and blame their blames, frightening away the more forceful human beings 
(483b8-83c2).” This is similar to the social contract type argument that Glaucon makes in 
the Republic (359a1-5), which is in no way essentially wrong, especially for democracies 
like Athens, or decisively refuted in the Republic or Gorgias.   
Callicles then remarks, “But I think nature herself reveals that it is just for the 
better (ameinō) to have more than the inferior (keironos) (483d1).” Callicles endorses 
leading a life according to nature as opposed to convention, the two being “mostly 
opposed”. This idea is nothing revolutionary.29 Further, it bears two striking similarities 
                                                 
27 Marian Demos, ‘Callicles Quotation of Pindar in the Gorgias’, Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology Vol. 96 (1994) pp. 85-107, p. 87. 
28 Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Ethics Bk 9.4. 
29 Demos, ‘Callicles Quotation’, pp. 85-107; For discussions of the distinction between 
nature (phusis) and convention (nomos) in Greek literature of the fourth and fifth 
centuries B.C. see Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 55-134 (especially pp. 
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to Socrates’ own views. In the Republic Socrates also makes the argument that the just 
life is according to nature and the life ruled by convention is tantamount to being a slave.  
With his famous cave (lit. “cave like structure”) analogy, he argues that citizens of a city 
are literally like slaves of the nomos.30 Only by escaping from, literally throwing-off the 
shackles of (Republic 514a6), convention and ascending to nature and life by nature, does 
one attain the truly just way of life, which turns-out to be the philosophic life. Callicles 
likewise argues, despite the immoralist veneer of his speech, which seems to eschew all 
notions of justice, that the life according to nature is the most just way of life (483d1, 
484b1). His description is even reminiscent of the philosophers’ escape from the cave: 
“When some man arises with a nature of sufficient force, he shakes off all that we have 
taught him, bursts his bonds and breaks free (484a3-4).” Fussi comments, “Callicles may 
well represent, both in his expressed theories and in his instantiation of those theories as a 
character in the dialogue, the philosopher’s alter ego.”31   
Second, Socrates even makes the same argument about having more for oneself.  
In the Hipparchus, which is about profiteering or gain, Socrates leads an unnamed 
Comrade to the conclusion that all men, good and wicked, desire the most for themselves.  
In the process he praises the tyrant Hipparchus. The word nomos is conspicuously absent 
from the dialogue and Socrates focuses on things that are good by nature (phusis), a word 
that occurs several times, beginning with a farming analogy (225c5-10).32 It has been 
                                                 
101-107 and 131-134 which mentions Callicles); and Kerford, The Sophistic Movement, 
pp. 112-130. 
30 The actual word, cave-like (spālaiōdā), leaves open the question, if not suggests, that 
the city is artificial and simply made to look like something natural. 
31 Fussi, ‘Callicles’ Examples’, p. 140; Consider the descriptions of the corruption of 
those with philosophic natures and of the tyrant as a perverted philosopher in the 
Republic (494b1-d5, 495b8-c7, 573a3-c8). For an interesting discussion of this darker 
side of the philosopher see Tessitore, Reading Aristotle’s Ethics, p. 61. 
32 Socrates proceeds to ask the Comrade about horsemen, pilots, generals, musicians and 
all artisans who work with tools and instruments and seek profit. Ranching requires more 
expertise than farming, navigation more than ranching and generalship still more than 
navigation. Thus, the analogies progress from the simple to the sophisticated. Further, 
while a single man can farm, ranching requires a family. Navigation requires still more 
people, and to wage war an army. Hence, the analogies also progress from the parochial 
to the urban. This progression parallels the transition from the city of utmost necessity to 
the feverish city in the Republic. While the city of utmost necessity had need of farmers, 
the more sophisticated arts like horse-breeding, navigation, and generalship, only emerge 
in the feverish city.   
      The first art mentioned is farming, whose product or aim is subsistence. The next arts 
mentioned are horse-breeding and sea-faring, whose aim is mastery, i.e. mastery of 
horses and the sea. Yet, the final examples of musicians and artisans proper seek beauty.  
Thus, there are essentially three different types of profiteers: seekers of subsistence, those 
who seek to dominate, and those who seek the beautiful and harmonious. This 
corresponds to the three classes of citizens in the Republic: the wage-earners motivated 
by bodily needs, guardians motivated by spiritedness and love of honor, and the 
philosophers motivated by love of wisdom and knowledge of the whole. The hierarchy of 
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suggested that Hipparchus is a caricature of Socrates himself.33 Socrates was, of course, 
accused of corrupting the youth and impiety and came to be admired for his wisdom.34  
Both the tyrant and philosopher look to nature as a guide that transcends conviction or 
what the city dictates. The tyrant looks for physical goods, or possessions, the 
philosopher intellectual, which leads him to question the city’s laws, its gods, and the 
way of life proscribed by and dedicated to the city. 
Consequently, the real difference between Callicles and Socrates is that Socrates 
is more radical, or radical in a different way, in his rejection of convention. The problem 
for Callicles, arguably, is that he has not sufficiently thought through what it means to 
free himself from convention. Callicles claims the superior man should disregard 
convention and live solely by nature (484a). Yet, the consequence is that the superior 
man seizes the most for himself, not necessarily of what is best by nature, as we would 
expect, but apparently of what is best by convention, “possessions” (484c3).  In 
particular, he mentions Heracles who took Geryon’s cows (484c1). The example shows 
how conventional minded Callicles is, because Heracles did not take the cows for 
himself, as a real tyrant would, but as a penance, i.e. so as to conform to convention. It 
was the tenth of his famous labors. 
Thus, Callicles’ superior man is still a slave to convention, because his desires are 
formed by convention and are the same as the many he looks down on. In a way the 
difference between Socrates and Callicles seems to be reflected in the distinction between 
the city of utmost necessity and the feverish city with luxuries and vice that subsequently 
emerges from it in the Republic (372c-e). Callicles superior man, if not Callicles himself, 
is a product of the feverish city: he is not natural. If he were as radical as Callicles thinks 
he is, he would not necessarily care about the same things the many do, one of which 
may be political power, as comes to light in the Republic (587d9-e3, 586a1-b3). 
However, the problem with this argument is that there were no philosophers in the 
city of utmost necessity. Philosophy, particularly Socratic philosophy, philosophy as the 
examination of speeches and different opinions, is a product of the feverish city. Many 
things are more necessary than philosophy and required for philosophy to flourish. In the 
kallipolis philosophers need not concern themselves with the workaday world, because 
the city provides for their every need. But, real cities do not. One must be a human being 
before being a philosopher, and human beings require “possessions”, which generally 
entails being part of a city and paying some attention to political things.       
Callicles continues his argument against convention by saying, “for the stronger 
to rule the weaker and to have more. After using what sort of justice did Xerxes lead his 
                                                 
souls in the Republic reflects the hierarchy of profiteering. Only the first and last arts 
mentioned do not require the city and do not promote war: they are peaceful arts (cf. 
Cicero De Officiis 1.42; Benardete 1971, 60). The different ways that men understand 
profit lead to the cultivation of different arts, which in turn reflect different types of lives.  
Consequently, although the Hipparchus is considered spurious by some scholars, it 
nonetheless seems very much written in the spirit and understanding of other Platonic 
dialogues and helpful for understanding them. 
33 Allan Bloom, ‘The Political Philosopher in Democratic Society: The Socratic View’, In 
Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990 (New York, 1996), pp. 105-123, p. 46-47. 
34 Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.14. 
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army against Greece, or his father against Scythians (483d7-483e1)?” Again, Callicles 
gives an ironic example, “because both Darius and Xerxes were defeated by the weaker 
inhabitants of Scythia and Greece.”35 This indicates the ambiguity in what it really means 
to be superior by nature, which Callicles has not thought through and Socrates uses to his 
advantage later.36  
Callicles then makes his most famous and ironic statement. “These men I think do 
these things according to the nature of the just, and yes, by Zeus, according to the law of 
nature (483e4).”37 What he thinks he means by this is not that they are necessarily 
successful in their endeavors, as the examples he gives shows, but that their desires and 
actions are not bound or dictated by convention: that is the law of nature. Socrates, in his 
desire to know many things, his philosophy, shows that he himself lives by this law in 
that he is not satisfied with what the city teaches is good, the best way of life, the ultimate 
causes of all things, the gods, and many other things he questions in the other dialogues.   
 
Critique of Philosophy 
 
Callicles then proceeds to a critique of philosophy or the philosophic life as 
Socrates led it. As many commentators have noted, “Callicles is not simply an opponent 
of philosophy.”38 He does not simply choose the active life over and against the 
contemplative life. Rather he says, “philosophy is a graceful thing if someone engages in 
it in due measure at the proper age.” Nonetheless, to waste too much time on it is “to 
become inexperienced in all those things that one who is to become a gentleman 
(kaloskagathos) must have experience of (484c8-d2).” Socrates himself tacitly admits as 
much, or leads interlocutors to a similar conclusion, in the Lovers where the question of 
what is philosophy, or what it means to philosophize, is discussed.39 Socrates leads an 
argument that suggests that just as not “much” exercise but rather “a measured amount” 
is good for the body as well as not “much” food but “a measured amount”, so it seems 
not much learning (or “things” related to learning), but “a measured amount” is good for 
the soul (134d7). This is the first of three definitions of philosophy suggested in the 
                                                 
35 Fussi, ‘Callicles’ Examples’, p. 122. 
36 However, Demos argues that this example adds emphasis to his “survival of the fittest 
theory”, because Xerxes and Darius were enemies of Greece. Thus, Callicles is 
condoning their imperialistic impulse despite its danger to Greece (‘Callicles’ Quotation’, 
p. 89, n12). 
37 The interjection of “by Zeus (or by the god)” may seem to give Callicles speech a 
religious overtone (cf. Dodds, Plato: Gorgias, pp. 266-267). However, I am inclined to 
think it is ironic or facetious. 
38 James Nichols, ‘The Rhetoric of Justice in Plato’s Gorgias’, In Plato: Gorgias (New 
York, 1998), pp. 131-149, p. 142. 
39 Like the Hipparchus the Lovers is considered by some scholars to be spurious.  
Nonetheless, other scholars argue for its authenticity [see Pangle “Introduction”, The 
Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues (New York, 1987).] If 
spurious, like the Hipparchus, nonetheless it seems to be written in the spirit of the other 
dialogues, and therefore of value for shedding light on Plato’s teachings and intentions as 
a whole.   
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dialogue. Callicles, likewise, advocates a measured amount of philosophy as long as it 
does not impede duty toward, and advancement in, the affairs of the city: “I think the 
most correct thing is to partake of both (485a5).” 
In particular, the problem with excessive philosophizing, according to Callicles, is 
that it makes one “cowardly (lit. unmanly)”, even if they have a good nature, and 
therefore “useless” both to the city and in the city (485d6). Socrates makes a similar 
warning in the Republic about allowing the guardians to study music to the neglect of 
athletic competition (gumnastikos), because it makes them effeminate, lacking courage 
and useless to the city: “When he [the guardian] continues [music] without letting up and 
is seduced, until he dissolves it [spiritedness] completely and cuts out, as it were, the 
sinews from his soul and makes it ‘a weak warrior’ (411b1-4)”.   
Further, this problem of uselessness is actually the second of the three definitions 
of philosophy arrived at in the Lovers by a line of argument instigated by Socrates. After 
leading his interlocutors, two lads, to the conclusion that philosophy is not “much” 
learning, but “a measured amount”, Socrates asks “what sort of things the one 
philosophizing must learn (153a8-9)?” It is suggested that the philosopher would learn 
“many things”, but this proves problematic because the polymath always turns-out to be 
second rate—and therefore useless—compared to specialists. Consequently, Socrates 
concludes, “We agreed that philosophy is noble and that we ourselves are philosophers; 
that philosophers are good, the good are useful and the worthless useless; again we 
agreed that philosophers are useless as long as there are artisans but that there are always 
artisans (137a4-6).”40 Philosophers turn out to be “worthless and useless” (137b1).  
Socrates does subsequently reject this conclusion, but not by way of argument or 
examination. He simply says, “But I suspect that this isn’t so.” Then, he turns to another 
line of argument. It is perhaps misleading to conclude that philosophy is simply 
worthless. Nonetheless the fact that Socrates instigated the line of argument that led to 
this conclusion and then simply turns away from it abruptly without further consideration 
makes one pause and, I think, suggests there is something revealing about it and 
philosophy as Socrates understands it. Further, although Socrates does later respond to 
Callicles’ criticism of philosophy in his cross-examination, he does not attempt to 
disprove the charge of its uselessness. Commenting on the later cross examination, 
Stauffer remarks, “It is worth recalling that Socrates has taken up only part of Callicles’ 
charge against philosophy: the reproach of vulnerability rather than that of uselessness.”41   
The ultimate difference between Callicles’ and Socrates’ view of philosophy is 
not its worth per se, but its purpose: Callicles argues that it should be directed toward the 
good of the city and be in the service of politics. He anticipates later thinkers like 
Machiavelli. In contrast, Socrates refuses to subordinated philosophy to a higher good.42  
                                                 
40 Grote suggests that this definition is given as a critique of the definition of philosophy 
given by some sophists (Plato, p. 449). 
41 The Unity, p. 149. 
42 In the final section of the Lovers Socrates argues that philosophy is not knowledge of 
the arts but rather self-knowledge, which is moderation (sophrosyne) and knowledge of 
how to make others good, which is justice (138b1-e5). If this is true, it would seem to be 
of great value to the city. However, as the Cleitophon suggests, it is far from clear that 
Socrates can deliver on these claims. Consequently, the final definition given in the 
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I think this ultimately accounts for a large part of the apparent difference between 
Socrates approach to politics, his unyielding defense of conventional morality, and 
Callicles’ Realpolitik.     
 
The Exhortation to Political Life 
 
In the final part of his speech Callicles compares himself to Zethus and Socrates 
to Amphion, these being two characters that debate the contemplative versus the active 
life in Euripides lost play Antiope (485e4-5). In part, this is an aspect of his exaggeration 
for the sake of clarity. As suggested, since Socrates has made such an extreme defense of 
conventional morality to the neglect of the exigencies of politics, Callicles encourages the 
opposite extreme.43 Yet one must keep in mind that in the central part of his speech, the 
section dealing specifically with the criticism of philosophy, Callicles equally criticizes 
those who never study philosophy as being slavish, or not free-born, and unfit to rule 
(485c9). In fact, later when subsequently pressed by Socrates to define more precisely 
what he means by “superior”, Callicles does not equate it with strength, as would 
traditionally be the case for Greek heroes like Heracles, but rather prudence (phronimos) 
(489e).   
 In fact, the argument Callicles makes is actually similar to the argument Socrates 
makes for philosopher-kings in the Republic to the extent that it is a combination of both 
philosophy and political rule. Albeit, the philosopher-king in the Republic only rules, or 
returns to the cave, because of necessity (540b5), not from a desire to rule, whereas 
Callicles seems to have a real desire to rule. He is an upstart politician. Socrates accuses 
him of being in love with the demos (481d6), which may be to some extent true. 
However, Callicles never concedes this point. Also, there is no historical evidence of 
such a person as Callicles to support it by reference to his political activities.  
Consequently, it is difficult to know to what extent Socrates’ accusation is true. In fact, I 
think it is partly, if not largely, rhetorical. It inclines the audience to call into question the 
validity of Callicles’ judgment, and more importantly it antagonizes Callicles to make his 
harangue against Socrates.     
More importantly, Callicles himself never says that ruling itself is simply good.  
In fact, his argument for rule is based more on necessity like the argument in the 
Republic. He does not argue that it is good for its own sake, but rather that it is 
                                                 
Lovers proves problematic, which points back to the second, central definition. As 
Clifford Orwin remarks on the problem Cleitophon reveals in the Cleitophon about 
Socratic philosophy, “Philosophy is not, as Socrates’ protreptic seems to suggest, a 
means to specifying the virtuous life: it takes the place of that life.” Orwin continues, 
“While exhorting to the scrutiny of those common opinions that support such agreement 
as does unite citizens, philosophy proves unable to replace them. It fosters not harmony 
but a new kind of discord—between itself and the city (‘On the Cleitophon’ In The Roots 
of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues (New York, 1987), pp. 117-
131, p. 131).  Alfarabi refers to the philosophers as a type of “weed” in the virtuous city 
(The Political Regime, §9), cf. Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 1.34,75 and 
3.34,534.       
43 Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1109b1-7. 
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“unmanly” or “uncourageous” not to rule. By not paying attention to politics, or by not 
being politically minded, a man cannot effectively pursue what is in his best interests and 
interest of his friends, family, and community (486a7-b3). This is the gist of the final part 
of Callicles’ speech and his exhortation to Socrates. We cannot help but think of how 
Socrates himself lived in extreme poverty, was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 
death, and thereby abandoned his family.44 Also, it recalls Socrates’ own argument for 
ruling in book one of the Republic that a good man will rule only so as not to pay the 
penalty of being ruled by lesser men (347b-c).   
As mentioned, Grote suggests that the underlying motive of Callicles’ concern for 
politics is fear, not honor, which is revealed in the last part of his speech. I suggest it is 
not so much a fear that his secret aspirations of justice and virtue cannot be realized, as 
Stauffer argues, but rather a fear motivated by love and concern for his family, friends, 
and community, which seems to be what Grote had in mind, although he does not 
elaborate. Recalling Aristophanes and his gripe against Socrates, Lutz argues in his 
interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium that Socrates, because of his 
attachment to philosophy, seems to be obtuse to most men’s love of their own and its 
relationship to justice. Yet, his need for students, or to persuade others of the worth of the 
philosophic life, belies his apparent detachment from love of one’s own. He wishes to 
make others like himself, which is arguably a form of love of one’s own he does not 
acknowledge. Consequently, to Aristophanes at least, he is less self-aware than he 
realizes.45   
A similar suggestion comes to light in the Hipparchus by noting Socrates’ 
similarity to Hipparchus. Socrates tells us that Hipparchus was a lover of wisdom, 
although he does not use the word philosopher or philosophy (presumably so as not to 
draw attention to the kinship between tyranny and philosophy). Hipparchus wished to 
share his wisdom with his fellow citizens. He wanted to educate his citizens and thereby 
be admired for his wisdom.46 To this end he installed Hermae with new sayings to replace 
the traditional teachings from the temple at Delphi. That is to say, the tyrant Hipparchus 
replaced the wisdom of the city, its law and that of its gods, with his wisdom and his 
                                                 
44 See Crito 45c8-d6. An underlying issue, which Socrates does not address, is the role of 
chance or fortune. Arguably, the philosopher is less subject to chance than the tyrant or 
statesman, because he is less in need of external goods. Nonetheless, this is precisely 
because he does not care for, nor is attached to, his friends and family the way ordinary 
men are. Further, while being a philosopher may give one a type of autonomy that most 
men do not have, becoming a philosopher requires many conditions, or good fortune, 
beyond one’s control. For a discussion of the role of chance in relation to happiness or 
the best life see Robert Bartlett, ‘Aristotle’s Introduction to the Problem of Happiness: 
On Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics’, American Journal of Political Science Vol.52 
(July, 2008), pp. 671-687.   
45 Lutz, Socrates’ Education, pp. 73-75; Eros is a passion particularly strong in the 
young, as Aristotle notes (Nic. Ethics 1156a32-1156b5). Appealing to that passion (e.g. 
characterizing philosophy as the highest manifestation of it as Socrates does via 
Diotima’s speech in the Symposium) is a good way of seducing the young. 
46 Cf. Protagoras 343c; and Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, Das Problem des Sokrates, 
§7. 
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teaching: Hipparchus takes the place of the gods. Did not Socrates perpetrate something 
similar in Athens? 
Does Socrates really know that justice is not rooted in love of one’s own, 
especially owing to the fact that it is very difficult, perhaps ultimately impossible, to fully 
distinguish between love of one’s own and love of what is good?47 It is Callicles’ fear 
that it is unjust to pursue philosophy to the neglect of love of his family, friends and 
community that lies at the heart of his criticism, which is more serious and worthy of 
consideration than Socrates allows the audience to consider. He tyrannizes the 





Socrates begins his cross examination of Callicles by compelling him to define 
more precisely what he meant by “stronger” or “superior”. In so doing, Callicles clarifies 
his view, saying: 
 
 First, the stronger are neither cobblers nor cooks, but  
 those who are prudent in the affairs of the city, and who   
 can determine in what way they will be managed—and not  
 only prudent but also manly [or courageous], being capable   
 of completing what they have in mind and not growing  
 weary through softness of soul.  (491a7-b4) 
 
Stauffer remarks, “We can see with particular clarity here that Callicles is not simply a 
debunker of justice and virtue but that he believes in a kind of justice based on a certain 
view of virtue (2006, 101).” The specific type of virtue endorsed is better understood by 
considering the men Callicles admires such as Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and 
Pericles.   
These men, and men like them, are keenly aware of necessity, of what must be 
done in certain situations, knowing full well that one cannot always choose the best way, 
but sometimes must choose the lesser of evils, to be willing to depart from good, as 
Machiavelli would say. For example, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build a 
navy even though it had some detrimental consequences.48 It established the conditions 
for imperialistic expansion, which did inadvertently facilitate greed and hubris among the 
citizens. Yet without this power, as Stauffer observers, “Athens would never have risen to 
prominence and power, or perhaps even have survived.”49 This ability to recognize 
necessity and do what must be done without being too committed to specific principles 
that prevent one from adapting to changing circumstances is an essential quality of 
effective leaders. It means not being committed to an idealistic approach to politics that 
Socrates endorses with his unyielding defense of conventional morality. 
                                                 
47 Lutz, Socrates’ Education, p. 76. 
48 Thucydides 1.19, 1.93. For Thucydides’ description of Themistocles’ virtues see 1.138. 
49 The Unity, p. 53, n33. 
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 While Socrates exhortation to justice and law-abidingness is, perhaps, not 
ultimately a high-minded naïveté, it no doubt seems so to Callicles. It probably appears to 
Callicles as a Nician type virtue, the general appointed to lead the Sicilian expedition 
which ended disastrously due to his excessive caution and piety. To the extent that the 
life Socrates exhorts calls to mind Nicias in contrast to Themistocles, it not only seems to 
Callicles imprudent, but also unjust: it endangers the city. Nicias’ lack of ingenuity and 
excessive commitment to convention caused many good men to lose their lives, as well 
as his own, and great harm to Athens.50 
 After Callicles explicitly states what he means by superior, Socrates abruptly 
turns the conversation away from a discussion of justice to a discussion of moderation, a 
turn that has puzzled many commentators: “Socrates procedure here is one of the most 
puzzling features of his entire conversation with Callicles.”51 The reason for the abrupt 
turn, I think, is simply so as not to examine Callicles’ understanding of virtue better. To 
do so would be to start to uncover the flaws with commitment to unyielding conventional 
morality for which Socrates has been arguing. Socrates might then be compelled to reveal 
that his true understanding of justice, and the philosophic life, has more in common with 
the Machiavellian appropriation Callicles favors than he wants to admit before the 
audience. 
 Instead Socrates turns to a demagogic discussion of moderation. He gives various 
myths that endorse moderation, which he knows will not have much affect on Callicles 
(494a5-7). They can and do, however, deflect the audience’s attention from the salient 
features of Callicles’ understanding of virtue. Yet despite his rhetorical flare, considered 
carefully the argument Socrates makes against Callicles’ call for immoderation “is not an 
impressive refutation of hedonism”.52   
 Socrates then turns the discussion of moderation into an attack on the men 
Callicles admires and therewith Callicles’ conception of virtue. 
 
  Tell me this in addition, if the Athenians are said to have 
  become better because of Pericles, or altogether the opposite 
  to have been ruined by him. For I at any rate hear 
  these things, that Pericles made the Athenians lazy, 
                                                 
50 Arguably, Nicias is not fully to blame for the failure of the Sicilian expedition.  
Plutarch does not hold him fully accountable and points to his deteriorating health as one 
reason for his failures. However, Plutarch does say that he was excessively timorous, 
which seems to be related to his excessive piety and law-abidingness, which led him to 
submit to, and help advance, base men. In particular, Plutarch faults him for helping 
Cleon’s advancement, which was very detrimental to Athens. At any rate, Nicias’ failings 
seem to show that excessive piety and law-abidingness is not just foolish or imprudent, 
but dangerous, especially for statesmen or anyone responsible for the lives and well-
being of others. 
51 Stauffer, The Unity, p. 102; see also Kahn, ‘The Drama and Dialect’, pp. 102-3; 
Klosko, ‘The Refutation of Callicles’, p. 127; and Gentzler, ‘The Sophistic Cross 
Examination’, p. 36. 
52 Stauffer 2006, 112; for a discussion of the problems and short comings of Socrates’ 
critique of hedonism see Stauffer 2006, 110-113 and Gentzler 1995, 36-38. 
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  cowardly, gossipers, and greedy. (515e2-5) 
 
While there may be some truth to these accusations, they are hardly the whole story.53  
Nonetheless, it prepares the audience for Socrates’ most outlandish and ironic claim that 
he alone of the Athenians practices the “true political art” (521d8). This would seem to be 
the one that makes citizens better, and yet this is far from his true affect. The way 
Socrates actually lived the philosophic life did not address all the citizens the way 
statesmen do. Mainly he conversed with promising youth, sophists, and occasionally 
politicians. When he does so, “Socrates does not seem to lead his fellow citizens all the 
way to virtue. Rather, he does two perhaps interconnected things: he produces perplexity 
in the young, and he abuses those who are older by making bitter speeches in public and 
in private.”54 Stauffer continues, “Considered in light of these indications, however, 
Socrates’ activity, while in some sense directed to the improvement of the young, cannot 
be regarded as an effort to inculcate virtue in any ordinary sense of the term…In other 
words, he is trying to show that his situation in the city is in fact a problem—a problem 
of which his ‘true political art’ is the cause, not the solution.”55 Consequently, Socrates’ 
argument about the “true political art” is so far from being a refutation of Callicles’ 
critique of philosophy, it is in essential respects a tacit validation of it, as Stauffer 
correctly argues. It is precisely this problem, the problem of Socrates, the potentially 
subversive effects of his philosophizing in the city, unintended or not, that makes his use 
of a nobler sort of rhetoric defending law-abidingness and conflating it with the 
philosophic life he leads so necessary and such a large part of the dialogue.    
 
Conclusion 
      
 Callicles’ speech critiquing Socrates uncompromising defense of conventional 
morality and philosophic way of life makes many validate points about the relationship 
between philosophy, human nature, and the need for a pragmatic, Machiavellian like 
approach to politics, which Socrates does not adequately address by the end of the 
dialogue despite the rhetorical flare of his cross examination. In fact, when carefully 
examined in light of Socrates’ own arguments in other dialogues such as the Republic, 
Hipparchus, and Lovers, similarities between Callicles’ understanding of politics, justice, 
and the best way of life come to light, which Socrates intentionally obfuscates in the 
latter half of the dialogue, such as the relationship between tyrannical and philosophic 
ambition and the precariousness or problematic nature of philosophy as a way of life as 
opposed to political ambition or attachment and dedication to one’s family, friends, and 
community. A Machiavellian will, of course, never admit to being a Machiavellian. To 
the contrary, they will appear and profess to be the exact opposite. 
Callicles’ argument is similar to Socrates’ own way of life in as much as both 
reject convention for the sake of nature as a guide. Further, Callicles does not simply 
condemn philosophy, but acknowledges the benefit of philosophy. His argument is 
similar to Socrates’ own argument for philosopher-kings in the Republic: both being a 
                                                 
53 Consider Thucydides 2.65. 
54 Stauffer, The Unity, p. 164. 
55 The Unity, pp. 164-165. 
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sort of combination of the contemplative and active life. The difference lies ultimately in 
the purpose of philosophy.  Callicles argues that it should be coupled with and in the 
service of politics, which leads to an endorsement of Realpolitik foreshadowing 
Machiavelli and similar moderns, e.g. Thomas Hobbes. Socrates refuses to subordinate 
philosophy to any higher consideration be it love of one’s family, friends, or community.  
To men like Callicles, this makes philosophy and philosophers useless to the city, if not 
dangerous, a criticism Socrates tacitly acknowledges in the Lovers. 
Despite Callicles’ silence and acquiescence to Socrates’ view of politics by the 
end of the dialogue, Callicles is hardly persuaded. What the debate reveals is not the 
superiority of Socrates’ apparent idealism to Callicles’ realism, which Callicles, along 
with at least some of the audience no doubt rightly knows has not really been refuted.  
Rather, we see the power of Socrates’ rhetoric, which conceals a deeper kinship between 
Callicles and Socrates on the one hand, and also an ultimately unreconciled debate about 
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